Broadway Intelligence Ltd – Global Investigations & Risk Analysis » Don’t Panic: Venezuela Won’t Invade Guyana

Summary: Despite heightened rhetoric, political theatrics, and regional unease, Venezuela’s recent posturing over its territorial claim against Guyana is unlikely to escalate into armed conflict. The dispute, rooted in a 19th-century boundary arbitration, has resurfaced as part of President Nicolás Maduro’s domestic political strategy rather than a genuine military campaign. This article examines the historical context, the 2023 flare-up, and the military, diplomatic, and geographic realities that make a Venezuelan invasion highly improbable.

Introduction

At the end of 2023, tensions between Venezuela and Guyana surged, reviving fears of a potential conflict over the disputed Essequibo region. While media headlines suggested imminent confrontation, the reality is more nuanced. Venezuela’s claim to the Essequibo dates back over a century, and although recent events, including a controversial referendum and military signalling, have amplified rhetoric, a full-scale invasion remains extremely unlikely.

This article explores the roots of the dispute, Maduro’s domestic motivations, and the multifaceted constraints, military, diplomatic, and geographical, that make escalation improbable.

The potential for armed conflict between Venezuela and neighbouring Guyana grabbed the headlines at the end of 2023, seemingly out of the blue. In fact, Venezuela’s territorial claim against Guyana dates back to 1899 and the contested delineation of the frontier between Venezuela and what was then British Guiana, the sole outpost of the British empire on the South American mainland.

Since 1899, Venezuela has continuously claimed sovereignty over 62,000 square miles of sparsely populated but potentially mineral rich territory west of the Essequibo river, territory which today forms part the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, independent from Britain since

In that year, the UK, Venezuela and newly independent Guyana signed the Geneva Agreement that bound the parties to find a peaceful and practical solution to the dispute pending an arbitration by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In 2020, the Secretary-General referred the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 1 December 2020, the ICJ stated that “Pending a final decision in the case, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela shall refrain from taking any action, which would modify the situation that currently prevails in the territory in dispute, whereby the Cooperative Republic of Guyana administers and exercises control over that area.”

In December 2023, President Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian leftist government held a referendum in which the Venezuelan electorate was asked whether the Essequibo region (known in Venezuela as “Esequiba de Guayana” or the “Zona de Reclamación”) should become a state of Venezuela and its inhabitants Venezuelan citizens. Clearly designed to appeal to populist and nationalist sentiment, the referendum passed with 95% support for annexation.

Provocatively, Maduro subsequently announced his country’s intention to “incorporate” Essequibo, while the Venezuelan military published plans to build an air base in eastern Venezuela to “ . . serve as a logistical support point for the integral development of Essequibo.” In response to rising tensions and to send a dissuasive signal to Caracas, the US in December 2023 announced joint military exercises with Guyana, while the United

Kingdom dispatched the Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) HMS Trent to take part in these exercises.

So what’s behind the sabre-rattling and how likely is armed conflict?

Domestic politics in Venezuela is likely the primary driving force behind the latest rekindling of the territorial dispute, rather than any serious intention to use military force to change the status quo. The whipping up of nationalist sentiment over Essequibo was designed to seize back the domestic political narrative from opposition presidential candidate María Corina Machado, at least temporarily, and to divert popular attention away from Venezuela’s chronic economic woes.

Speculation that Venezuela’s actions are part of a resource-grab related to Guyana’s newly found offshore hydrocarbons reserves have some credibility but only in the sense that they add incentive to what was already a longstanding territorial dispute.

Consequently, our considered view is that rhetoric notwithstanding, the likelihood of a full-scale invasion of Guyana is practically zero for the following military, diplomatic, and geographical reasons:

Military –

The modernisation of the Venezuelan military under former President Hugo Chávez (1999 – 2010) saw the country move away from its traditional arms suppliers such as the US, France, and Italy and toward much greater procurement from Russia and China. Some of these Russian and Chinese systems certainly give the Bolivarian National Armed Forces of Venezuela (FABN) significant combat capabilities, at least in comparison to the tiny Guyana Defence Forces (GDF), in particular Russian-supplied Sukhoi Su-30 Flanker fighter aircraft, T-72 main battle tanks (MBTs), and Mil Mi-24 Hind attack helicopters, as well as the Chinese-built Type 08 amphibious infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs).

Meanwhile, some of Venezuela’s legacy military equipment may still give it significant military advantage in the dispute. For example, the Venezuelan navy still has four South Korean-built Capana-class amphibious landing vessels which, although close to 40 years old, could theoretically be used to transport and deploy Venezuelan marine infantry on Guyanese territory. Additionally, the Spanish-built Guaiquerí-class OPVs, which entered service as gun-only platforms in 2011, are reported to have been upgraded with Chinese-made C-802A anti ship missiles. Together with four missile-armed Peykaap-III fast-attack craft acquired from Iran in 2023, these ships pose a more than credible maritime threat.

However, despite the acquisitions and upgrades mentioned above, Venezuela’s military capabilities are far less potent in reality than they are on paper. The last two decades of gross economic mismanagement coupled with rampant corruption have seen even the most modern equipment fall into disrepair.

Of the original 22 Su-30 Flanker aircraft, it remains unclear how many remain serviceable following accidents and cannibalization of air frames for spare parts. Likewise, the navy’s flagship – the Italian-built Lupo-class frigate Mariscal Sucre - is reported to have partially sunk while tied up in port, while its sister ship General Soublette is thought to have been scrapped. It is also doubtful that Venezuela’s single remaining German-built Type 209 diesel-electric submarine remains seaworthy. Doctrinally, the FABN has undergone a fundamental transformation under Chávez and Maduro, from being one of Latin America’s most professional militaries to a highly politicized force whose principal aim is to prop up the government and help Maduro continue with Chávez’ Bolivarian Revolution. Current FABN doctrine adopts the principles and language of a "people's war of resistance" against “imperialist enemies” while maintaining “internal order” and participating in government economic development plans and programs. None of that indicates a senior command structure skilled in the planning and execution of complex joint operations that an

invasion of Guyana would require.

Diplomatic –

Venezuela’s latest claims on Guyanese territory have met with a conspicuous absence of public support from countries with whom it maintains friendly relations. In particular, Venezuela’s staunchest ally Cuba has made no public statement on the dispute, while Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel held a cordial meeting with his Guyanese counterpart in the margins of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change (COP28) in Dubai in December 2023. Likewise, China has remained studiously neutral, saying only it maintains friendly relations with both countries, while a spokesman for the Russian government said that both countries should settle their dispute through “political and diplomatic means.” If Maduro

thought he would receive the full-throated diplomatic support of his key international allies, he must be sorely disappointed.

Conversely, CARICOM, the Organization of American States (OAS), Brazil, France, the UK, and the US have all demonstrated broad support for Guyana’s position. Further, although Maduro has ludicrously accused the US, Guyana and its principal offshore energy investor ExxonMobil of trying to “destabilize” Venezuela, there has been a limited rapprochement in relations with Washington in recent months.

The Biden administration in October 2023 said it would ease sanctions against companies that trade in Venezuelan oil or invest in the Venezuelan oil industry if the Maduro government undertook to allow free and fair elections in 2024. With Maduro’s government desperate to reinvigorate both oil exports and investment in domestic production, it may have to moderate its stance on Guyana in order to avoid squandering this opportunity of relief from US sanctions.

Geography –

Finally, geography does not favour a Venezuelan invasion of Guyana. The majority of the frontier between the two countries runs through remote, densely forested and mountainous territory, aside from a small coastal plain at the delta of the Essequibo river. Such terrain does not lend itself to conventional military operations using armour and mobile infantry. Moreover, population centres in the region are small and isolated, and there is only a minimal road network. It is hard to see how any army, let alone one deficient in equipment and saddled with a politicized rather than a professional military ethos, could realistically mount an invasion, hold territory and perhaps even repel a counterattack by the GDF, particularly if that enjoyed US intelligence and logistical support.

Additionally, Maduro would likely have considered the consequences of a failed invasion and a defeat for the FABN. Nationalist passions can be a double-edged sword, as Argentina’s military dictatorship found out in 1982, when its invasion of the Falkland Islands / Malvinas in April of that year was met with huge popular support, but ultimately resulted in the collapse of the junta following Argentina’s defeat in the conflict.

In summary, we assess that Venezuela will not invade Guyana and that it will eventually seek to de-escalate tensions in 2024. Maduro will calculate that there is more diplomatic and economic advantage to be gained by engaging in a constructive dialogue with Guyana, perhaps under Brazilian sponsorship. That said, Maduro may modulate tensions, ramping them up when it suits domestic political requirements, and dialling them back when he calculates to do so would be in Venezuela’s strategic interest.

Maduro and his generals probably know the chances of a successful invasion of Guyana and the incorporation of Essequibo as an integral state part of the Bolivarian Republic are remote. So, although the rhetoric may remain provocative and bellicose for the next few months, and while there is a latent threat of Venezuelan actions short of war (such as limited cyber-attacks on Guyanese targets and online disinformation), a full-scale inter-state war between Venezuela and Guyana remains only a remote possibility.

Conclusion

Venezuela’s rhetoric over the Essequibo region reflects political opportunism rather than preparation for war. President Maduro’s strategy aims to consolidate domestic control, divert attention from economic decline, and appeal to nationalist sentiment. However, the reality of Venezuela’s weakened military, limited diplomatic support, and inhospitable geography renders a full invasion nearly impossible.

As geopolitical tensions persist, Venezuela is more likely to pursue symbolic or limited actions, political manoeuvring, cyber operations, or information warfare, while maintaining the appearance of strength. Ultimately, diplomacy and regional mediation, especially through Brazil and CARICOM, are likely to prevail over conflict.

Key Points

Venezuela’s territorial claim over Guyana’s Essequibo region dates back to 1899.
The December 2023 referendum on annexation was a domestic political tool to stir nationalism.
Venezuela’s armed forces possess some advanced weaponry but are crippled by corruption and poor maintenance.
No major allies — including Cuba, Russia, or China — have publicly backed Venezuela’s claims.
The U.S., U.K., Brazil, France, and CARICOM nations support Guyana’s territorial sovereignty.
Geography heavily favours Guyana, making any Venezuelan invasion logistically implausible.
Maduro is expected to de-escalate tensions while using the issue for domestic political gain.
A full-scale conflict remains an extremely remote possibility.

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Don’t Panic: Venezuela Won’t Invade Guyana

Introduction

Conclusion

Key Points